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CIVIL AERONAUTICS BOARD OF THE
OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL OF
FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS
BY JERROLD SCOUTT, JR., AND COATES LEAR*
HE Civil Aeronautics Board has never declined to issue a Foreign Air
Carrier Permit because of dissatisfaction with the ownership and/or
control of the applicant. However, in three recent cases this was a hotly
contested issue,1 and it promises to remain so. The problem is, of course,
not confined to the three small airlines whose applications have most recently
raised the issue., It affects any U. S. citizen (but particularly U. S. air car-
riers) seeking foreign aviation investments; it affects foreign governments
and foreign carriers seeking outside capital and technical assistance; it
affects foreign air carriers planning consolidated or pooled operations to the
United States; and it must somehow be reconciled with our planned assist-
ance for friendly foreign nations. It is the purpose of this Article to trace
the development of these rules, to survey the manner in which they have
been applied by the Civil Aeronautics Board, and to analyze the considera-
tions which justify their retention.
I. WHAT ARE THE STANDARDS?
Origins of Rule. In January 1941, 25% of all of the local airline opera-
tions in Latin-America were owned by German nationals.2 This fact, coupled
with the dramatic efforts which eliminated the Axis influence in hemisphere
aviation, lead to the following resolution of the Foreign Ministers of the
American Republics assembled at Rio de Janeiro, January 28, 1942:8
"CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL AVIATION
"Whereas:
"1. The American Republics by mutual understanding have agreed
to unite in a common effort to resist the attempts of any foreign power
through force or subversion to destroy their individual or collective
freedom;
"2. The peaceful pursuit of such a course is presently threatened
by the non-American countries at war with American Republics whose
resort to subversive methods and force is inimical to our common integ-
rity; and
"3. It has been amply demonstrated that the operation or use of
aircraft in the American Republics by nationals of non-American coun-
tries at war with American Republics and the use of airfields and aviation
facilities in these Republics by such nationals constitute a serious threat
to hemispheric defense,
* Members of the District of Columbia Bar.
1 TACA International Airlines, S. A. (of El Salvador), Order No. E-15114,
approved April 22, 1960 (3 year Permit); Reopened Aerolineas Peruanas, S. A.,
Foreign Permit Case, Order No. E-15538, approved July 12, 1960 (2 year Permit);
and Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S. A. (of Honduras), Order No. E-15548,
approved July 18, 1960 (1 year Permit).
2 Burden, The Struggle for Airways in Latin America, Council on Foreign
Relations (1943), p. 161.
8 Department of State Bulletin, February 7, 1942.
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"The Third Meeting of the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of the Ameri-
can Republics
Resolved:
"To recommend to each American Republic that in harmony with its
national laws, immediate steps be taken to restrict the operation or use
of civil or commercial aircraft, and the use of aviation facilities to bona
fide citizens and enterprises of the American Republics or to citizens or
enterprises of such other countries as have shown themselves, in the
judgment of the respective Governments, to be in full sympathy with the
principles of the Declaration of Lima. ' 4
This same view is attributed to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in
the conferences which preceded the Chicago Convention. 5 Rules as to owner-
ship and control of airlines were thereafter embodied in the documents
produced by the Chicago Convention, and this modern day "Monroe Doc-
trine" has been incorporated in all of the Bilateral Air Services and Air
Transport Agreements negotiated since that date by the United States. In
its present form, the rule provides as follows:
"Each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke the
operation permission provided for in Article 3 of this Agreement from
an airline designated by the other contracting party in the event that it is
not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control of such airline
are vested in nationals of the other contracting party . . ."
By this reservation, each contracting party may unilaterally satisfy itself
as to the facts of ownership and control, but the standards of what consti-
tutes "substantial" and "effective" are matters of interpretation of the
Bilateral Agreement. 6 The way this has been handled by the Civil Aero-
nautics Board is summarized in the following paragraphs.
Substantial Ownership. There is no decision of the Civil Aeronautics
Board which specifies what percentage of equity constitutes "substantial
ownership," although the Department of State, presumably after consulta-
tion with the Board, did so in a note exchanged simultaneously with the
execution of the Bilateral Air Transport Agreement with the Republic of
Peru. The pertinent provisions of this note are quoted below:
"The experience of recent months leads to the conclusion that the Gov-
ernment of Peru will be able to promote the formation of one or more
Peruvian aviation enterprises for the purpose of being designated, as
regards the Agreement, only if a reasonable period of time could be avail-
able for a company originally formed with a moderate percentage of
effectively Peruvian capital, to increase gradually under the control of the
Government of Peru, the proportion of Peruvian capital until a minimum
proportion of 51% is reached, which will permit securing for it the title
of an effectively Peruvian company; . . .7
There is no other example of a similar interpretation. It is interesting to
note, however, that when the Civil Aeronautics Board shortly thereafter
passed upon the application of Peruvian International Airways for a foreign
air carrier permit, these rules were not applied because the Board was
apparently not "satisfied" that these requirements had been met. However,
4 The Declaration of Lima, approved December 24, 1938, had reaffirmed the
solidarity of the American states and their decision to defend themselves against
foreign intervention.
5 Smith, Airways Abroad, The University of Wisconsin Press (1950), p. 151,
quoting A. A. Berle, Jr., who was then an Assistant Secretary of State.
6 Such interpretation should follow the general rules of contract construction,
beginning with the proposition that the intention of the parties must govern. One
important difference should be noted. Where international agreements are executed
in counterparts, one in the language of each contracting party (as is case with
Bilateral Air Transport Agreements), little use can be made of the local technical
definition of words. See: In Re Zalewski's Estate, 292 N. Y. 332, 55 N. E. 2d 184
(1944).
7 Treaties and other International Acts Series, No. 1587, Department of State,
p. 17.
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since the ownership rules are discretionary rather than mandatory, the
Permit was nonetheless issued.8
Much of the controversy that later developed could have been avoided
had the Board announced either (a) that a 51% equity interest constituted
"substantial ownership," or (b) that a foreign country's own requirements
of local ownership would be accepted as meeting the standard in the Bilateral.
TABLE No. 1
EXAMPLES OF AIRLINE OWNERSHIP REQUIREMENTS
Percentage of Local
Country Ownership Required Citation
United States 75% Section 101 (13) Fed. Av. Act
Colombia 51% 7 CAB 149 (1946)
Venezuela 51% 7 CAB 317 (1946)
Panama 60% 8 CAB 44 (1947)
Dominican Republic 51% 12 CAB 766 (1951)
Costa Rica 60% 12 CAB 232 (1950)
Peru 60% CAB Order No. E-15538 (1960)
El Salvador None CAB Order No. E-15144 (1960)
Ecuador 51% CAB Order No. E-15819 (1960)
It is unrealistic to assume that the other party to a Bilateral Agreement
"intended" to accept any higher standard of "substantial ownership" than
that required by its own laws. This, of course, does not answer the problem
for countries such as El Salvador that have no requirements of local owner-
ship of their flag-carriers. In such instances, the best guide as to what is
acceptable to the Civil Aeronautics Board is that which has been accepted;
examples of this are shown in Table No. 2.
The standard of substantial local ownership of foreign air carriers is
often complicated by the Civil Aeronautics Board's announced determina-
tion to eliminate any "substantial interest" held in such carriers by U. S.
air carriers.9 There is, therefore, a potential conflict between the standards
of the Bilateral ("substantial ownership") and rules asserted under Section
408 ("substantial interest"). For example, even though a U. S. air carrier
held a 25% stock interest in Transcontinental, an Argentine carrier, the
Board was able to make the required findings of substantial local ownership
for Section 402 purposes;10 nevertheless, this investment constituted a
"substantial interest" for Section 408 purposes and divestment within 5
years was ordered.1 ' Such rules cut foreign air carriers off from equity
supplied by U. S. air carriers, although the Board would have no jurisdiction
to impose a similar restriction where the U. S. investor was not an air
carrier.12
8 Peruvian International Airways, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 8 CAB 229,
233 (1947).
9 The doctrine was originally expressed in the Havana-New York Foreign Air
Carrier Permit Case, 14 CAB 399 (1951), and was reaffirmed in the Board's deci-
sion in Aerovias Venezolonas, Foreign Permit, 20 CAB 746 (1955), and later in
the proceeding entitled California Eastern Aviation, Inc. et al., Control and Inter-
locking Relationships, Order No. E-12118, January 16, 1958.
10 CAB Order No. E-12117, Jan. 3, 1958.
11 CAB Order No. E-12118, Jan. 16, 1958. It is not clear how much less than a
25% interest would be "substantial" for these purposes, although in certain Section
408 problems the Board has said that a "minute percentage may be a substantial
part." See: Pan American-National, Opinion & Order, E-13124, Oct. 31, 1958;
Northwest-Eastern Equipment Interchange, 19 CAB 346 (1954); Continental-
United Equipment Interchange, 17 CAB 635 (1953).
12 Compania Dom., Cap-Haitien and Port-Au-Prince Service, 19 CAB 823(1955).
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Effective Control. Except for those few instances where a controlling
stock interest was held by others than nationals of the applicant's home-
land,' 3 the test of "effective control" is even more illusive than that of
"substantial ownership." Even in those cases where U. S. interests were
found to be in control of foreign air carriers the Board has given few clues
as to how much control constitutes "effective control.' 14
There is a temptation in defining this standard to look to the Board's
tests for "control" in Section 408 proceedings, which involve mergers
and consolidations. Beginning with the case of Railroad Control of North-
east Airlines, 4 CAB 379 (1943), the Board has adhered to a very broad
interpretation of the word "control."'15 As interpreted for Section 408 pur-
poses, "control" is now practically indistinguishable from "influence,"' 16 and
it seems that the Board's jurisdiction under this Section of the Federal
Aviation Act is constantly being expanded to reach "public interest" objec-
tives.17 However, the definition of "effective control" in foreign air carrier
permit cases is largely a matter of the interpretation of international agree-
ments, and not regulation as such, The requirement of Section 1102 of the
Federal Aviation Act is that the Board administer Section 402 consistently
with obligations assumed under the Bilateral Air Transport Agreements.' 8
There is no provision in Section 402 that the Board must find the owner-
ship and control of the foreign applicant complies with U. S. standards of
"public interest." The requirements for local ownership and control are
13 TACA International Airlines, S. A., 18 CAB 737 (1954); Cuba-Florida Air
Carrier Permit Case, 12 CAB 292 (1950); Canadian Pacific A. L., Air Carrier
Permit, 10 CAB 138 (1949); TACA, S. A., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 10 CAB
130 (1949); Peruvian International Airways, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 8 CAB
229 (1947); TACA, S. A., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 7 CAB 715 (1946); Lineas
Aereas Mexicanas, S. A., Temporary Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 6 CAB 165
(1944).
14 Compania Dom., Cap-Haitien and Port-Au-Prince Service, 19 CAB 823
(1955); Havana-New York Air Carrier Permit Case, 14 CAB 399 (1951); 16
CAB 371 (1952).
15 "Since there is no legal or technical meaning of control apart from that
accorded the term in ordinary usage, it is apparent that control may apply to and
cover a wide variety of situations. When 'broadly used (control) may embrace
every form of control, actual or legal, direct or indirect, negative or affirmative.'
As the late Justice Cardozo stated, a 'dominating influence may be exerted in other
ways than through a vote.'" (pp. 381-2)
The same view was adopted in the following cases: Pan American Airways,
Inc., Acquisition of Aerovias de Guatemala, S. A., 4 CAB 403, 405, 406 (1943);
Pan American Airways, Inc., Acquisition of Aeronaves de Mexico, S. A., 4 CAB
494, 496 (1943); National-Caribbean-Atlantic Control Case, 6 CAB 671, 680(1946); Braniff Airways, Inc., Acquisition of Aerovias Braniff, S. A., 6 CAB 947,
948 (1946); Acquisition of Mid-West by Purdue Research Foundation, 14 CAB
851, 856 (1951).
16 See: Meteor-Metropolitan Aircraft Sale and Lease-Back Proceeding, Docket
Nos. 8934 and 8946, Brief of Bureau Counsel, and Initial Decision of Examiner
Pfeiffer; Arthur Vining Davis Enforcement Proceeding, Docket No. 8250, Com-
plaint, Answer to Motion to Dismiss, and Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Order
No. E-10944, January 11, 1957; Transocean-Atlas Case, Docket Nos. 8943 and
10337, Initial Decision of Examiner Ruhlen, June 8, 1959. However, in the Pan
American-National Agreement Investigation, Order No. E-15541, July 14, 1960,
the Board does recognize (p. 11) the difference between the "power to influence"
and the "power to control," at least for purposes of Section 408(a) (5) of the Act.
17 See: Allen, Section 408 of the Federal Aviation Act: A Study in Agency
Law-Making, 45 Va. L. Rev. 1073 (1959).
18 In non-Bilateral cases, the Board is free to apply the broad Section 408
standards in determining how much non-national ownership and control is in the
public interest. But in Bilateral cases, the Board is confined to a reasonable inter-
pretation of what constitutes "substantial ownership and effective control." Despite
this distinction, the Board has held that the ownership and control rules are
"equally applicable to those situations where there is no bilateral in force." TACA
International Airlines, S. A., 18 CAB 737, 738 (1954).
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found exclusively in the Bilateral Agreements; under Section 402, the Board
is restricted to finding "such applicant fit, willing and able."
One solution would be to equate "effective control" with "voting control,"
which would guarantee that the final or ultimate decisions rested with
nationals of the applicant's homeland. Such a standard would be (1) con-
sistent with objectives that originally led to the imposition of the ownership
and control condition, (2) consistent with the intention of the parties
negotiating the Bilaterals, and (3) easy to administer. A recent alternative
solution equated "effective control" with "negative control" in the Reopened
Aerolineas Peruanas, S. A., Foreign Permit Case, supra, where the Board
reached this conclusion at page 4 of the mimeographed opinion:
"With regard to requiring divestiture of the block of APSA stock
owned by Servicios, we see no present need for such a condition. Neither
the bilateral agreement nor Board policy demands 100 percent ownership
of APSA's stock by Peruvian nationals, and sinee under Peruvian law
the holders of two-thirds of a corporation's stock can take any corporate
action of any description, it is clear that Servicios will not be in a position
to exercise even negative control over APSA's corporate activities by
reason of its stockholding."
This decision probably rules out any non-national interest in excess of a
331/3% stock interest, even though a 40% non-national interest is permis-
sible under the laws of Peru. The problem is that the Civil Aeronautics Board
has not been trying to interpret the contract (i.e. the Bilateral Agreement),
but for the most part has been trying to determine how much non-national
ownership and/or control is consistent with U. S. objectives., Unilateral
standards have been applied by the Civil Aeronautics Board to a bilateral
problem, whereas it would seem that the question of interpreting what con-
stitutes substantial ownership and effective control should be resolved under
the machinery provided in the Bilateral itself:
"ARTICLE 10
"Except as otherwise provided in this agreement, or its Annex, any
controversy between the contracting parties relative to the interpretation
or application of this agreement, or its Annex, which cannot be settled
through consultation shall be submitted for an advisory report to the
Interim Council of the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organiza-
tion, in accordance with the provisions of Article III, Section six (8) of
the Provisional Agreement on International Civil Aviation signed at Chi-
cago on December 7, 1944 or to its successor, unless the contracting parties
agree to submit the controversy to some other person or body designated
by mutual agreement between the same contracting parties. The executive
authorities of the contracting parties will use their best efforts under the
powers available to them to put into effect the opinion expressed in such
report."
Vested in nationals. The term "vested" as distinguished from "contin-
gent" or "potential" seems to -have been involved in only one Section 402
case-TACA International Airlines, S. A., supra. Here the applicant sought
to establish both "substantial ownership" and "effective control" for Section
402 purposes by proving that a national of El Salvador held (from the U. S.
owners) an irrevocable proxy to vote 31% of the total shares and an irrevo-
cable option to purchase 16% of the shares. 19 Although the requirement of
a vested interest was technically not before the Board because there is no
Bilateral with El Salvador, the agency's conclusion is probably a binding
precedent:
19 Contrast the arrangement in Transcontinental, S. A. (Argentina), Order
No. E-12117, January 3, 1958, where a U. S. air carrier's stock interest was placed
in a voting trust in order to sterilize its "substantial interest" for Section 408
purposes.
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"And with regard to control, the nature and effect of Kriete's voting
rights under the option agreement (as detailed in the Examiner's deci-
sion) do not satisfy our requirement of effective control. While, technically
speaking, the proxy held by Kriete coupled with the voting rights in his
own shares, could be viewed under certain circumstances as giving him
the power to control TACA, this kind of arrangement is too artificial and
elusive to satisfy the basic purposes of our ownership and control policy.
Indeed, we believe TACA's whole reorganization plan tacitly recognizes
this fact."
No case has been found where the term "national" as distinguished from
"citizen" has been an issue; however, an interesting question is suggested
by the fact that some stockholders of foreign airlines are known to hold
dual citizenship.
Nationals of the other contracting party. This present language in the
Bilateral resulted from the following evolution:
a. Nationals of a contracting state. This was the rule in both the Inter-
national Air Services Transit Agreement (the so-called "Two Freedoms"
Agreement) and the International Air Transport Agreement (the so-called
"Five Freedoms" Agreement), both of which were signed at Chicago,
December 7, 1944.
The effect of this rule was discussed as follows in an excellent concurring
opinion in the case of Venezuelan Airlines, Air Carrier Permit, 7 CAB 317,
327 (1946) :
" . . this broad provision . . . permits the national of any signatory
state to organize air transportation enterprises under the flag of any
other signatory state . . .,20
And its purpose was described in these terms:
"It was designed to permit a country that might not otherwise be able
to finance its own airlines to enjoy the prestige attaching to international
operations by an airline carrying its flag, or to permit a smaller country
not having its own airlines to designate an existing international carrier
for the purpose of developing air services to other countries."
b. Nationals of either party. The Chicago Convention also produced a
draft of a Bilateral Air Transport Agreement, which was in fact used by the
United States in all Bilaterals negotiated through August, 1946.21 In 16
instances, the United States has agreed that "substantial ownership and
effective control" must be "vested in nationals of either party to the agree-
ment." This means, for example, that even though BOAC were owned and
controlled by Americans, or Pan American were owned and controlled by
British nationals, each would nonetheless be entitled to operating permits.
c. Nationals of the other contracting party. Beginning with the Brazilian
Bilateral in September, 1946, and continuing since that date, every one of
the agreements contains the present language as to ownership and control,
which exchanges the word "either" for "other." The interesting, though
still unanswered question, is why should the change have been made?
The fact that the change occurred in connection with the Brazilian agree-
ment may be significant because we now know that the designated Brazilian
20 In the case of TACA, S. A., Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 7 CAB 715 (1946),
the denial of the application was urged because TACA, operating under the flag
of El Salvador, was controlled by a Panamanian corporation. While El Salvador
and the United States were signatory to the Chicago Air Transport Agreement,
Panama was not. The fact of the matter was that the Panamanian holding com-
pany was owned by citizens of the United States. The Permit was granted as a
matter of discretion, not right.
21 These included, in order of their signature date, Bilateral Air Transport
Agreements between the United States and Spain, Denmark, Sweden, Iceland,
Ireland, Switzerland, Norway, Portugal, Czechoslovakia, United Kingdom, Turkey,
France, Greece, Belgium, Egypt and Lebanon.
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REGULATION OF FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS
carrier (Aerovias Brazil) was at the time of the Bilateral a part of the
TACA System, which was owned and controlled by a British subject. See:
Aerovias Brasil, S. A., Air Carrier Permit, 8 CAB 348 (1947). However,
it is obvious that a British-owned and controlled Brazilian-designated air
carrier could not meet the requirements of a U. S.-Brazil Bilateral referring
to "nationals of either party." The change in language was not necessary
if the U. S. objective were to exclude Aerovias Brasil as then constituted.
It may be, however, that this situation simply led to a reappraisal and
tightening of the ownership and control provisions, although the motive
for doing so remains obscure.
II. WHEN SHOULD A PERMIT BE WITHHELD?
In a number of Section 402 cases, the Civil Aeronautics Board has
actually found the applicant to be substantially owned and/or effectively
controlled by nationals of another country. Examples of this are shown
in Table No. 3.
Under these circumstances, the United States could have withheld the
Foreign Air Carrier Permit.23 The considerations governing the decision
whether or not to do so have been these:
A. Subsidy. Beginning with the Havana-New York Air Carrier Permit
Case, 14 CAB 399, 401 (1951), the Board expressed this fear of U. S. carrier
investments in foreign airlines:
"Where the American carrier receives mail pay support from the Gov-
ernment, there is always present the danger that portions of such mail
pay may find their way indirectly into the support of the foreign carrier."
The seriousness of this problem was first apparent when the Board reopened
Pan American's Transatlantic Final Mail Rate Case, Order No. E-11146,
March 20, 1957, where on the basis of preliminary audits it was found that
Pan American had under-charged its foreign affiliates and over-charged
Uncle Sam., The Board reached this conclusion:
" . . in the light of the specific items of information outlined herein,
which indicate that for the 1946-1953 period alone Pan American's prop-
erly recognizable expense, which was underwritten with subsidy, may have
been overstated by as much as $6,500,000, we think it clearly our duty and
responsibility to re-examine, in the public interest, the mail pay awarded
in this proceeding. Moreover, our duty in this respect is plainly evident
23 In the Reopened A.erolineas Peruanas, S. A. Foreign Air Carrier Permit
Case, supra, it was argued the U. S. did not have this right. The English version
of Article VI of the Bilateral Agreement between the U. S. and Peru reserves to
each Contracting Party the right "to withhold" or revoke a permit if the substan-
tial ownership and effective control standard is not met. In the equally authentic
Spanish version, "suspender" appears as the purported equivalent of "to withhold."
It was argued that "suspender" meant "to suspend," and not "to withhold"; con-
sequently, the Permit first had to be issued. This argument was supported by the
fact that the Spanish versions of the U. S. Bilaterals with other Spanish-speaking
countries do not use the word "suspender"; for example, Chile and Venezuela-
"retener" (to withhold); Cuba and Spain-"rehusar" (to refuse or decline);
Dominican Republic and Paraguay--"negar" (to deny or refuse) ; Ecuador and
Panama-"no otorgar" (not to grant) ; and Mexico--"no conceder" (not to grant).
However, in Articles 62 and 88 of the Convention on International Civil Aviation
(Chicago Convention) "suspender" and "to suspend" are equated.
Perhaps the U. S. version, which retains more control for the permit-issuing
state, would nevertheless govern. The World Court discussed a similar situation as
follows: "The Court is of opinion that, where two versions possessing equal author-
ity exist one of which appears to have a wider bearing than the other, it is bound
to adopt the more limited interpretation which can be made to harmonize with both
versions and which, as far as it goes, is doubtless in accordance with the common
intention of the parties." (Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Jurisdiction),
Permanent Court of International Justice Publications, Series A, No. 2, pp. 10-21
at p. 19 (1924).)
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when it is considered that transactions between Pan American and its
affiliates aggregate some $50,000,000 annually."
Although the initiation of this case was applauded in Congress in 1957,24
the matter was not even set for hearing until three years later.
About this same time, the Board instituted an investigation into the
financial relationship among Pan American World Airways, Inc. and Various
Affiliates, Order No. E-11103, March 8, 1957, as shown in Appendix A of
said order:
TABLE No. 4
FINANCIAL INTEREST HELD BY PAN AMERICAN




Company Under Laws of PAA
Aeronaves de Mexico, S. A. Mexico 21.13
Aerovias Nacionales de Colombia, S. A. Colombia 38.13
Aerovias Venezolanas, S. A. Venezuela 30.
Compania Cubana de Aviacion, S. A. Cuba .oa
Compania Dominicana de Aviacion C por A Dominican Rep. 40.
Compania Mexicana de Aviacion, S. A. Mexico 41.88
Compania Panamena de Aviacion, S. A. Panama 33.
Lineas Aereas Costarricenses, S. A. Costa Rica 33.33
Lineas Aereas de Nicaragua, S. A. Nicaragua 20.
Panair do Brasil, S. A. Brazil 48.
Pan American-Grace Airways, Inc. Delaware 50.
Servicio Aereo de Honduras, S. A. Honduras 40.
Urba, Medellin and Central Airways, Inc. Delaware 100.
a Included because of past affiliation.
Source: Order No. E-11103, March 8, 1957, Appendix A.
No further action of any sort has been taken in this Docket.
Subsequently, in the case of Pan American World Airways, Inc.-Acqui-
sition of LACSA (Reopened), Docket No. 6594, an Examiner of the Board
concluded that Pan American's control of the Costa Rican carrier should be
disapproved for a number of reasons, including the possibility that U. S.
mail pay would find its way into the support of the foreign carrier. Although
this Initial Decision was issued on November 15, 1957, there has been no
Board action yet. This inaction in each of these cases suggests that the
financial aspects of this problem are not now matters of serious concern
to the Board, which may in part be excused by the fact that Pan American
is no longer a subsidized carrier and that the Board may at its leisure correct
past accounting errors.
B. Reciprocity. The second reason originally advanced in the Havana-
New York Air Carrier Permit Case, supra, for disapproving U. S. control of
foreign air carriers was expressed in these terms:
".... an even greater danger lies in the fact that such American owner-
ship or control may prove embarrassing in negotiating for the exchange
24 Report on Airlines of the Antitrust Subcommittee of the Committee on the
Judiciary, House of Representatives, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., April 5, 1957, p. 248.
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of operating rights with the country of nationality of the foreign carrier.
When our Government seeks operating rights in a foreign country on
behalf of one American carrier, and a second American carrier owns an
interest in the foreign carrier operating from that country into the United
States, a conflict of interests may ensue as between the American carriers,
and may seriously interfere. with prompt and satisfactory exchange of
operating rights with the country concerned."
This fear, unlike the first, proved groundless.2 5 As a matter of fact,
those cases where ownership and control were most seriously questioned by
the Civil Aeronautics Board were the very ones where the foreign govern-
ments most enthusiastically urged the issuance of a permit. 2
6
C. Defense. The fear of third country ownership and/or control of
applicants for Section 402 Permits gave rise, as we have noted, to the present
ownership and control provisions in the Bilateral Air Transport agreements.
However, with two possible exceptions, 27 this has never been a factor in
Section 402 proceedings. Nevertheless, the apprehension continues and has
been urged as a reason for continuing U. S., ownership and/or control of
foreign flag carriers. For example, on the basis of somewhat less than
satisfactory presentations by the Departments of State and Defense28 in
25 In the Reopened LACSA Case, supra, one of the reasons urged by the
Examiner in disapproving Pan American's control of the Costa Rican carrier
was the protest of a third country (El Salvador), which was supporting a rival
airline (TACA).
26 See: TACA International Airlines, S. A., Docket No. 8711, Initial Decision,
p. 3; Reopened Aerolineas Peruanas, S. A., Docket No. 8955, Initial Decision, p. 12,
quoting an official representative of the President of Peru:
"We have permitted all American carriers who have requested permits
to go into Peru and we have not been going into much technicalities of
the process of issuing permits to American companies, as we could have,
and we have done that because of the reciprocal treatment that we will
hope to have when we, the Government of Peru, issues or signs the
bi-lateral agreement."
A similar point was noted by the Board in the case of Transportes Aereos Na-
cionales, S. A., Order No. E-15548, approved July 18, 1960:
"Of great weight in deciding upon a renewal of TAN's permit is the
desire of the Board to give recognition, insofar as practicable, to the
wishes of the Honduran Government as reflected in its endorsement of
TAN's application."
27 In Peruvian International Airways, Foreign Air Carrier Permit, 8 CAB
229 (1947), the Board found the applicant owned and controlled by citizens of the
United States and Canada; in Canadian Pacific Airlines, Air Carrier Permit, 10
CAB 138 (1949), the Board found the applicant owned and controlled by citizens
of the United States and Great Britain.
28 These presentations are summarized as follows at page 4 of the Initial
Decision:
"Although the reopening order looked to the possibility that other Government
agencies would submit their views as to the consistency of the control relationship
with the public interest, no Government agency, other than the Board through its
Bureau of Air Operations, submitted evidence in the reopened phase of this
proceeding. The Bureau's witness did, however, disclose the view of the State
Department to the extent it is reflected in the following paragraph contained in a
classified letter dated February 15, 1956, from the State Department to the Chair-
man of the Board:
'It appears to the Department (of State) that the evidence used by
the examiner in arriving at his initial decision that the Pan American
relationship with LACSA is not in the public interest may not be fully
compelling, and that there may be a balance of advantage to be gained
by permitting continuance of the relationship.'a
In addition, the Department of Defense submitted a statement of position, for
which it requested and obtained confidential treatment pursuant to rule 39 of
the Rules of Practice.b Although the contents of this statement cannot be sum-
marized in this decision, the Department goes no further than to cite, in support
of a policy encouraging United States airlines to assist smaller nations in estab-
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the still pending Reopened LACSA Case, supra,29 the Examiner made the
following findings:
"Among the considerations urged as warranting approval, the strong-
est is probably the possibility that Pan American's withdrawal would
leave a vacuum to be filled by a large airline of European nationality.
This risk was discussed in the prior initial decision and the conclusion was
reached that, in LACSA's present state of development, a new affiliation
did not appear probable. The record developed since the reopening order
does not serve to heighten the likelihood of a substitute affiliation."
Nevertheless, the Defense Department thereafter (March 6, 1958) presented
this strong argument to the Board in support of Pan American's continued
control of the Costa Rican flag carrier:
"Soviet Russia has recognized the value of civil aviation as an element
of national power and prestige, and is developing a formidable capability
to challenge United States leadership in this field. Under the circum-
stances, it is unlikely that any vacuum in the air transport system of
small nations will remain long unfilled. If our national objectives of main-
taining United States leadership in international civil aviation is to be
realized, there must be no diminution of United States influence in foreign
aviation activities, especially in the Western Hemisphere."
As it becomes apparent that Latin American nations, for example, are
not inextricably tied to the United States, defense considerations may once
again take precedence over the commercial factors in appraising the pro-
priety of U. S. ownership and control of foreign air carriers.
D. Anti-Trust. There are no Civil Aeronautics Board decisions which
relate the policies of the anti-trust laws to the control of foreign carriers
by U. S. airlines.30 However, in the yet undecided Reopened LACSA Case,
supra, the Examiner discussed at length Pan American's control of the Costa
lishing air transportation systems, general national security considerations of no
different character than those upon which Pan American relies.
a The State Department's letter of February 15, 1956, to the Chairman was
stamped 'For Official Use Only,' was classified as confidential, and was not deemed
available for the record. The Department consented, however, to disclosure of the
quoted paragraph.
b By order No. E-10991, dated January 31, 1957, the Board directed that the
Defense Department's statement of position be withheld from public disclosure."
29 A similar argument was submitted by the Defense Department in the case
of TACA International Airlines, S. A., Docket No. 8711:
"Any action which might lead to foreign, and especially unfriendly,
control of the air transportation systems of Costa Rica or other small
nations in conditive (sic) areas would be contrary to the national security.
It is the view of the Department of Defense that American private enter-
prise should be encouraged to maintain and enter into arrangements to
assist Latin American and other technically backward nations in the
development of their air transportation systems where such assistance is
welcomed by the countries concerned."
The Board did not comment on this problem in its Opinion in Order No. E-15144,
5 April 1960.
3'0 This has been done, however, by the Celler Committee in its 1957 Report on
Airlines. The Report found (p. 255) that the acquisition or formation of foreign
carriers by Pan American either eliminated competition or made its competitive
position more secure. The Report concluded (p. 277) that this created important
issues with respect to the enforcement of the anti-trust laws. Report of Anti-trust
Subcommittee of the Committee on the Judiciary, House of Rep., 85th Cong. 1st
Sess., 1957. The Civil Aeronautics Board has often deferred to "established anti-
trust principles" in other situations. See, for example, Order Nos. E-15693,
E-15692 and E-15691, all dated August 25, 1960, relating to credit or credit card
systems for purchase of air transportation; Order No. E-15651, August 12, 1960,
relating to Prepaid Ticket Advice Resolution of the Air Traffic Conference;
VOLUMAIR, Order No. E-15077, April 6, 1960; Local Cartage Agreement Case,
15 CAB 850, 852 (1952); Air Freight Tariff Agreement Case, 14 CAB 424, 425
(1951).
REGULATION OF FOREIGN AIR CARRIERS
Rican flag carrier in terms of Sections 7 and 10 of the Clayton Act (15
U.S.C.A. Sections 18, 20). He concluded that Section 7 had been violated
because the Pan American-LACSA affiliation tended to create a monopoly
in the Panama-Miami market, and to lessen competition in the Havana-
Panama market. He also found that the spirit, though not the letter, of
Section 10 (which prohibits certain transactions between affiliated common
carriers) had been violated. This was one of several reasons why he recom-
mended disapproval of the control relationship.
This problem is, incidentally, involved in a pending District Court case
which promises to be one of major significance: United States v. Pan Ameri-
can World Airways, W. R. Grace and Company, Pan American-Grace Air-
ways, Inc., (D.C. S.D. N.Y. Civil Action No. 90-259, 1959). The following
illustration is from pages 112-113 of the Government's Trial Brief:
"An agreement was signed on April 20, 1938 between Faucett, Panagra
and Aerovias which provided: (1) that in consideration of the withdrawal
of Aerovias from local service Faucett would turn over to Aerovias 20%
of its stock. Aerovias would have two directors on the Faucett Board;(2) that Panagra would not participate directly in any enterprise dedi-
cated to local air transport in Peru other than Faucett but that it could
continue its local services inside of its international itinerary; (3) that
Panagra would maintain the existing difference between Faucett and
Panagra tariffs for the local transport of passengers in Peru. Both com-
panies agreed to modify local tariffs in the case of competition from other
companies; and (4) that Faucett would give up all international connec-
tions and operate only locally in Peru. Further, that Faucett would not
enter into interline agreements with any international airline without
Panagra's consent."
E. Assistance to under-developed countries. The Civil Aeronautics
Board has never interfered with the temporary use of American capital and
technical assistance for the airline operations of friendly foreign countries,
particularly under-developed countries. Such aid is "in the public interest,"'1
and numerous "technical assistance" agreements which left little to the
foreign carrier except the sale of tickets have been approved.32 The resulting
loss of "effective control" was generally overlooked because of the temporary
nature of the assistance. For example, in the case of Trans Caribbean Air-
ways, Inc., and Aerovias Interamericanas de Panama, S. A., Order No.
E-8910, January 24, 1955, the Board stated the policy in these terms:
"Furthermore, an arrangement of this type is consistent with this
government's over-all policy of assisting friendly foreign countries for
temporary periods in developing their own resources and in enabling them
on the basis of that assistance to continue their activities without further
aid thereafter."
F. Competition. The concurring opinion in the case of Venezuelan Air-
lines, Air Carrier Permit, 7 CAB 317, 329 (1946), expressed the fear that
U. S. ownership and/or control of foreign air carriers would be both (1) a
31 See: Aero Nacionales de Colombia, S. A., Foreign Air Carrier Permits,
7 CAB 149 (1946); Lineas Aereas Mexicanos, S. A., Temporary Foreign Air Car-
rier Permit, 6 CAB 299 (1945); Aero Transportes, S. A., Temporary Foreign Air
Carrier Permit, 6 CAB 159 (1944).
32 See, for example: California Eastern Aviation, Inc., et al., Lease Agreement
and Exemption Application, Order No. E-12118, January 16, 1958; In the Matter
of an Agreement between Trans World Airlines and the Imperial Ethiopian Gov-
ernment, Order No. E-10688, October 19, 1956; Slick Airways, Inc., and Airwork,
Ltd., Agreement and Exemption Application, Order No. E-8977, February 25,
1955; Transocean Air Lines, Inc., and Airwork, Ltd., Agreement and Exemption
Application, Order No. E-8976, February 25, 1955; Seaboard & Western Air Lines,
Inc., and Aerlinte Eireann IIA, Agreement, Order No. E-7108, January 28, 1953;
E-12308, March 31, 1958; In the Matter of an Agreement between Pan American
World Airways, Inc., and Aryana Airlines Co., Ltd. (Afghanistan), Order No.
E-11612, July 23, 1957.
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.device to evade the Civil Aeronautics Board certification procedure, and
(2) the cause of excessive competition-particularly in the Caribbean area.
In some circumstances, however, competition became a reason for approv-
ing, rather than disapproving, U. S. ownership and/or control, as illustrated
by the case TACA International Airlines, S. A., 18 CAB 737, 738 (1954)
"It appears that the applicant herein is the only carrier available to
El Salvador for a reciprocal route to the United States. The Salvadoran
Government does not have before it any other applicant that it could
endorse for the route sought herein. Nor is there any indication that there
is sufficient capital available in El Salvador to promote a new carrier at
this time. If we award a permit to the applicant, the interests of El Salva-
dor will be preserved. At the same time, steps can be taken toward increas-
ing the proportion of Salvadoran capital in the ownership of the applicant.
It is our hope that steps will be taken to reduce gradually the percentage
of stock owned by United States nationals, in order that the nationals of
El Salvador may ultimately achieve substantial ownership and effective
control of the carrier."
But the Board has generally been firm in prohibiting the use of foreign
affiliates to enhance the competitive position of a U. S. air carrier. One of
the best examples of this policy is found in the Havana-New York Air
Carrier Permit Case, 14 CAB 399, 402 (1951) :
"So long as Pan American holds a substantial interest in Cubana, it
may be expected that Pan American's activities in relation to Cubana will
be so conducted as to inure to Pan American's benefit. It will, accordingly,
be to Pan American's interest to route passengers between New York and
Havana via Cubana, rather than National, or Eastern and Pan American
connecting at Miami. This will enable Pan American to compete indi-
rectly with Eastern and National by diverting traffic from these two
American certificated airlines. We cannot ignore the fact that we have
recently refused to grant Pan American a route between Miami and New
York. It would be strange indeed to follow such action with the award
of an unrestricted permit for substantially the same service to a carrier
such as Cubana, in the light of its relationship to Pan American. We feel
it is our duty, under the circumstances, to so condition the award as to
reduce to a minimum the diversion and consequent injury to National
and Eastern."
This policy was specifically reaffirmed in the recent Pan American-National
Agreement Investigation, Order No. E-15541, July 14, 1960.
In the case of California Eastern Aviation, Inc., et al., Control and Inter-
locking Relationships (Transcontinental, S. A.), Order No. E-12118, Janu-
ary 16, 1958, it was suggested that the Cubana doctrine might not be
applicable where the U. S. investor was not an air carrier:
"There are several pertinent factors which clearly distinguish the situ-
ation we are faced with herein from the factual circumstances involved
in such cases as the Havana-New York Permit Case.c In the first place,
the record makes plain the fact that Transcontinental will control its own
sales efforts and compete for traffic on its own identity and reputation;
there will be no 'palming off' of Transcontinental's operations to the public
as that of a United States carrier. Furthermore, it is significant that
heretofore California Eastern has not been an established air carrier, and-
will become an 'air carrier' under the Act only through its arrangements
with Transcontinental. Thus, we are not faced with the situation of an
established United States air carrier attempting to extend its route in
the guise of lending assistance to a foreign air carrier. Furthermore, it
is clear that the present arrangements are designed as a practical means
for allowing a foreign carrier to inaugurate service over a new route.
c 14 CAB 399 (1951)."
The limits of this qualification were clarified in the case of TACA Inter-
national Airlines, S. A., Order No. E-15144, approved April 22, 1960:
"It is TACA's further contention that the Board's established owner-
ship and control requirement is operative only where the United States
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investor is an air carrier, and that there is no question here of an Ameri-
can air carrier owning or controlling TACA. In support of its position,
TACA cites California Eastern Aviation, Inc., et al. We cannot accept the
distinction suggested by TACA, and there is nothing in the California
Eastern Aviation case inconsistent with our policy. On the contrary, in
that case we approved California Eastern's acquisition of a stock interest
in Transcontinental, S. A., for a number of reasons, including the practical
necessity for allowing a foreign air carrier to inaugurate service over a
new route, but we also stressed that California Eastern was expected to
dispose of its stock interest in the foreign air carrier within a specified
period."
This competitive factor is largely, though not exclusively, a private inter-
est, which must be balanced against public considerations, previously dis-
cussed. To date it has been properly subordinated.
III. CONCLUSION
Whenever "substantial ownership and/or effective control" has been at
issue in Section 402 proceedings, the Civil Aeronautics Board has generally
reached the right answer for the wrong reason. The Board has consistently,
'and erroneously, overlooked the fact that the ownership and control require-
ments are (in 55 instances) imposed by agreements between sovereign
states and must be interpreted by ascertaining the intention of the contract-
ing parties-not by looking to the policies of the Federal Aviation Act.
This error, however, has been counter-balanced to date by the Board's
decisions not to withhold the issuance of foreign air carrier permits in any
event.
Of all the factors leading to such decisions, one in particular appears to
have been underplayed: That is the recognition that international civil
aviation has a Jekyll and Hyde personality-it is both a commercial enter-
prise and an instrument of foreign policy, This latter aspect may in the long
run prove to be the most significant consideration of all.
